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or a region that has produced more history than it can absorb, ten years is not a long 
time in the Western Balkans. 
Yet,  in  the  ten  years  that  have  passed  since  the  EU-Western  Balkans  summit  in 
Thessaloniki in June 2003, major developments have led to a turning point in the fortunes of 
the region. These developments would not have been possible without the process known as 
the  Thessaloniki  Agenda  adopted  at  that  summit,  which  confirmed  the  EU  accession 
perspective for the countries of the region. The language adopted was very clear: "The future 
of the Balkans is within the European Union." 
The Agenda set out in considerable detail the EU approach in preparing the countries of the 
region for EU accession, confirming the stabilisation and association process launched at the 
previous EU-Western Balkans summit in Zagreb in November 2000 as the framework for the 
"European course of the Western Balkan countries, all the way to their future accession". 
Following the lead of Macedonia, which was the first to sign a stabilisation and association 
agreement  (SAA)  in  2001, most  of  the  other  countries  embarked  on  the same process  in 
subsequent years; Kosovo being the likely latest addition with the expected green light from 
the June European Council to start negotiations. 
Meanwhile, Croatia, which was the second country to sign an SAA in late 2001, is about to 
become the 28th member of the EU, while accession negotiations have already started with 
Montenegro and are expected to start with Serbia soon, following the landmark agreement 
reached in the EU-facilitated dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. 
These  developments  are  further  proof  of  the  positive  momentum  generated  by  the 
Thessaloniki Agenda and of the continued attraction of EU accession, despite the current 
adverse economic climate in the EU. 
What probably had the greatest impact in terms of tangible benefits for the citizens of the 
region, as well as giving them a sense of belonging to the EU family, was the granting of 
visa-free travel to the Schengen area. Citizens of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia were 
granted  visa-free  travel  in  December  2009  and  the  citizens  of  Albania  and  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina were granted the same status a year later. 
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This was by no means an automatic process. It involved a detailed roadmap of institutional 
and administrative reforms relating to strengthening the rule of law, combating organised 
crime,  corruption  and  illegal  migration,  as  well  as  strengthening  border  control  and 
guaranteeing  security  of  identity  and  travel  documents.  The  success  of  this  exercise 
demonstrates that the countries of the region do have the administrative capacity to deliver if 
they focus their minds on the job and are given clear and detailed conditions to fulfil in 
return for the granting of the agreed benefits. 
On the more political front, the recent agreement between Kosovo and Serbia demonstrates 
the  continued  strength  of  the  EU  integration  perspective.  This  agreement  represents  a 
defining  moment  in  High  Representative  Catherine  Ashton’s  legacy  and  a  well-deserved 
outcome for the many hours she devoted to mediating between two leaders who, only a few 
years back, were sworn enemies. 
It also shows the effectiveness of the EU's ‘soft power’ if it is used in a consistent manner. 
There is no reason why similar progress cannot be made elsewhere in the Balkans, such as in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which demands particular attention but where the EU's presence is 
not as effective as it could be. 
Herein  lies  the  dilemma  facing  the  EU  in  its  current  enlargement  strategy  towards  the 
Balkans, ten years after Thessaloniki. 
Out of necessity the EU initially focused on security issues with the successful deployment of 
some of its newly established foreign policy tools (the EU military mission in Macedonia in 
2003 and EU police missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and subsequently in Macedonia). 
Attention gradually shifted from stabilisation to association and the present day emphasis on 
all  the  institution  building,  rule  of  law,  economic  and  other  reforms  required  for  EU 
integration. The current priority on judiciary and fundamental rights, justice, freedom and 
security places rule of law issues, including the fight against corruption and organised crime, 
at the centre of the EU's enlargement policy. 
At  the  same  time,  however,  recent  developments  in  some  of  the  countries  of  the  region 
highlight fundamental weaknesses, such as the lack of a culture of political dialogue and 
consensus  building,  which  continue  to  undermine  prospects  for  long-term  stability  and 
cannot  be  ignored.  This  is  certainly  the  case  in  Albania,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and 
Macedonia.  Unresolved  constitutional  issues  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  also  affect  the 
overall climate. 
Inter-ethnic tensions, exacerbated in some cases by the deep-rooted nationalist policies of the 
governing parties and issues relating to the rights of persons belonging to minorities remain 
prevalent. Sadly, some EU member states don't set a good example here. 
Bilateral disputes such as the one between Greece and Macedonia also impact negatively on 
the  enlargement  process,  deflecting  attention  from  the  real  reform  deficiencies  and 
consuming far too much energy that could be more usefully deployed elsewhere. Indeed, the 
failure  so  far  to  resolve  these  bilateral  disputes  has  fuelled  public  resentment  in  those 
affected countries, often encouraged by the government concerned, against what is rightly or 
wrongly perceived as the lack of fairness and double standards of the EU and some of its 
member states. 
These are reminders of how heavily the legacy of the Balkans' turbulent history continues to 
weigh in the region, and how easy it is for positive trends to be reversed. They should not be 
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A positive narrative one day can become a nightmare scenario the next. In 2005, Macedonia 
was  regarded  as  a  success  story  in  overcoming  inter-ethnic  tensions  and  promoting 
courageous  reforms;  an  effort  the  EU  rewarded  by  granting  candidate  status  for  EU 
accession.  Today  it  is  a  country  marked  by  political  instability,  the  lack  of  any  political 
dialogue, deep mistrust among the ethnic communities and a deeply divided society. All this 
puts its EU accession prospects at risk – the only objective that unites the entire country. 
The response to this dilemma requires a more determined and consistent policy from the EU. 
Political stability and security, as well as resolving outstanding constitutional issues, should 
remain at the forefront of the EU's attention. 
At  the  same  time,  the  EU  should  realise  that  excessive  delays  in  allowing  accession 
negotiations to start, or holding the process hostage to bilateral complaints of some member 
states, thereby undermining the element of fairness in the conditionality principle, will fuel 
nationalist  agendas  and  make  the  reform  process  more  difficult.  It  also  diminishes  the 
usefulness of the stabilisation and association process itself. 
EU  member  states  would  be  the  first  to  agree  that  the  intrusive  nature  of  the  accession 
process and the stringent requirements for opening and closing chapters gives the EU greater 
leverage to keep the negotiating country on track, to rein in nationalist tendencies and ensure 
the best results from the reform agenda. 
The  European Commission, meanwhile,  needs  to  preserve  the  rigorous  objectivity  in  the 
annual assessments contained in its progress reports for each country. Failure to uphold that 
rigorous  approach  by  attempting  to  minimise  reform  weaknesses  will  only  undermine 
whatever leverage it has. 
The best way for the European Council to mark the tenth anniversary of the Thessaloniki 
Agenda in June would be to take bold decisions that could inject new momentum into the 
enlargement process, such as: 
- Setting a date for opening accession negotiations with Serbia, as well as for opening SAA 
negotiations with Kosovo. This would be a recognition of the efforts of both Pristina and 
Belgrade in reaching agreement over power-sharing in the Serb majority communities in 
Kosovo, as well as an encouragement to continue with reforms and the further normalisation 
of relations. 
- Setting a date for opening accession negotiations with Macedonia, this being the only way 
to keep the EU's aspirations of the country on track and prevent it from sinking further into 
instability. Commissioner Štefan Füle's recent statements of concern belie the frustration with 
a political leadership oblivious to the harm it is causing to the country's image. 
- Allowing the formal screening process to start for both Macedonia and Albania. Although it 
is  essentially  a  very  technical  exercise,  the  "analytical  examination  of  the  acquis 
communautaire”  (commonly  referred  to  as  ‘screening’)  is  traditionally  the  first  step  once 
negotiations have formally started; it examines in minute detail every aspect of a country's 
level of preparedness in fulfilling accession requirements, and is an excellent way of locking 
a country into the tough discipline of the accession process. 
- Encouraging more intensive engagement of the EU institutions with the political leaders 
and institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, using all the leverage at the EU's disposal, in 
order to resolve outstanding constitutional issues and promote a spirit of consensus. 
-  Engaging  more  systematically  with  civil  society,  ensuring  direct  access  to  EU  funding 
under simplified procedures. An enhanced role for civil society should be a core task of the 
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ensuring a critical mass to guard against governments with autocratic tendencies, as well as 
a greater buy-in for society in general in the EU accession process. Civil society also plays a 
critical  role  in  fostering  reconciliation  and  helping  to  come  to  terms  with  the  region's 
turbulent past. 
- Enhancing interaction with organisations such as the Council of Europe and the OSCE, 
whose proven expertise in media freedom and minority issues – lacking in the EU – would 
bring an added value to the EU's effectiveness out in the field and ensure a more concerted 
effort. 
Next year’s 100th anniversary of the dramatic events in Sarajevo will bring endless debate 
and much soul-searching about the place of the Balkan region in Europe’s history. Injecting 
new momentum now into the European perspective for the Western Balkan countries will 
help to shape that debate in a positive manner. The conclusion of the 2005 International 
Commission  on  the  Balkans  is  as  valid  today  as  it  was  then:  "…the  logic  for  a  further 
enlargement is compelling: without the Balkans in the EU, the process of unification will 
remain incomplete." 
 
 
 
 
 
 